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ABSTRACT 
The current process of immigration and integration of foreign-born residents into 
European society could potentially cause significant shifts in the demographics, politics, 
and national identities of many European nations. The influence of immigration has 
stretched beyond the guest worker programs of the postwar era into long-term residence 
by foreign-born workers and peoples, accelerating after the end of the Cold War. 
Globalization further enables immigration, and these people have developed greater 
stakes in the economies and cultures they live within. The incorporation of these 
immigrants into the democratic process, specifically through their access to the ballot 
box, portends several important effects on European politics. The first and most obvious 
is through the expression of different political preferences by these immigrants and the 
degree to which they are assimilated, integrated, or incorporated into the political 
process. This thesis will examine how two major immigrant destination states within the 
European Union extend voting rights to immigrants from outside the EU. These will be 
Germany and Sweden. The thesis concludes that the historical path to democratic 
franchise, and migration controls establish legal precedents that shape the path to 
inclusion for each of these countries despite their contrasting outcomes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DEMOCRATIC SUFFRAGE IN EUROPE 
The historical relevance, treatment, and importance of immigration in Europe 
differs significantly from the United States. The United States long established itself as a 
nation of immigrants. The emigration history of European nations profoundly affected the 
character and makeup of the United States. By contrast, the influence of immigration on 
European nations is not as old as U.S. immigration history, but it is relevant to 
contemporary history and ongoing changes in Europe. The current process of 
immigration and integration of foreign-born residents into European society could 
potentially cause significant shifts in the demographics, politics, and national identities of 
many European nations. The influence of immigration has stretched beyond the guest 
worker programs of the postwar era into long-term residence by foreign-born workers 
and peoples, accelerating after the end of the Cold War. Globalization further enables 
immigration, and these people have developed greater stakes in the economies and 
cultures they live within. The long-term impact has and will continue to reach far beyond 
the short-term needs for labor. 
Because of the influx of immigrants into Western Europe, the incorporation of 
these immigrants into the democratic process, specifically through their access to the 
ballot box, portends several important effects on European politics. The first and most 
obvious is through the expression of different political preferences by these immigrants 
and the degree to which they are assimilated, integrated, or incorporated into the political 
process.  
Foreign workers in Western Europe participate politically more often and 
in more diverse ways than generally thought. Their participation often is 
politically disruptive and has contributed to the growing perception that 
the sociopolitical costs of foreign labor policy outweigh its economic 
benefits . . . . Until recently, most observers of European politics simply 
have ignored them. Among the handful who have not, mainly Marxists, 
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foreign workers are portrayed as an apolitical mass whose passivity and 
inferior legal status serves to reinforce the political status quo.1  
The response by host nations is often to restrict immigration, restrict the path to 
citizenship, or both. In the case of Germany, one of the fundamental expectations is that 
immigrants learn the German language and culture sufficiently to understand and accept a 
German concept of civic commitment, which is a qualification for citizenship and the 
right to vote. This represents a strong movement to assimilate immigrants to the host 
culture, ostensibly mitigating the effects of immigrant preferences on voting that might 
otherwise be different. 
Extension of suffrage to immigrants may also act as a conduit for spreading 
democratic ideals and expectations back to the emigrant countries. Increased access to 
communications and travel with native lands not only facilitates greater preservation of 
immigrants' native language and cultural identity, it can also act to transmit perceptions, 
expectations, and myths about Western democracy back to their native lands based on 
personal experience in their new countries of residence. Failure to gain access to the 
democratic process may be a factor in alienation and radicalization of groups within 
Europe and may also negatively influence the prospects of democracy in native lands. 
With this as a backdrop, I intend to look at how two major immigrant destination 
states within the European Union extend voting rights to immigrants from outside the 
EU. These will be Germany and Sweden. Historical analysis is used to determine the 
relevant underpinnings of voting rights for the selected countries—examining each 
country as an individual case before reflecting on salient similarities and differences. 
B. EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION TRENDS 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Western European states became 
immigrant destinations, reversing the predominant trend of the previous two centuries as 
labor exporters. Several factors have contributed to migration patterns unforeseen by the 
European states. These include two world wars, decolonization by European powers, the 
 
1 Mark J. Miller, The Political Impact of Foreign Labor: A Re-evaluation of the Western European 
Experience, Vol. 2, in Migration in European History, ed. Colin Holmes, 148–184 (Brookfield: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Company, 1996): 148. 
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collapse of communism and the Iron Curtain, the effects of globalization, and the 
instability and economic hardships in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In spite of the 
historical trend that Europe has been an emigrant source, Western Europe has become an 
immigrant destination. Even within Europe, however, there is a profound disparity 
between countries and the relative number of immigrants each accepts. In 2006, twelve 
states, mainly Western European countries within the EU27, received in excess of 30,000 
immigrants each, and together these countries accounted for over 93 percent of the three 
million immigrants to EU states that year. (See Table 1) 
1. History of Immigration 
Shortages or surpluses in the labor market are the primary drivers in shaping the 
extent (character) of immigration pressures and state policies. In fact, “throughout the 
eighteenth century, the need for workers and soldiers was so great in many of the 
European countries that measures were taken to hinder emigration. It was not until 1793 
that England, with the passing of its Alien Bill, introduced immigration control.”2  
Thomas Hammar provides an excellent summary of historical trends for European 
migration from the nineteenth century forward. The most prevalent influence on 
immigration policy for Europe during the nineteenth century, however, were a 
combination of high birth rates and low death rates. Foreign travel, to include working 
and taking up residence was largely unregulated, “with the exception of tsarist Russia.”3 
The scope of emigration from Europe during this period exceeded 34 million persons, 
with only France and Switzerland receiving significant numbers of immigrants prior to 




2 Gören Rystad, Immigration History and the Future of International Migration, Vol. 2, in Migration 
in European History, ed. Colin Holmes, 555-586. (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1996): 
556. 
3 Tomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of 
International Migration (Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1990): 42. 
4 Ibid. 
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1. Free immigration and large emigration 1860–1914 
2. Immigration regulation and aliens control: a 
provisional system made permanent, because 
of unemployment and racism 
1914–1945 
3. Liberal immigration: recruitment of foreign 
labor, and colonial immigration 
1945–1974 
4. Strict immigration regulation: only family 
members and political refugees admitted.5 
1974– 
 
The postwar period of liberal immigration is the most important to the present 
question of voting rights as it represents the largest movement of persons within or into 
Europe. It is also important because of one critical assumption at work in nearly all of the 
immigrant destinations during this period—that workers brought into a given country to 
satisfy labor shortages would eventually return to their country of origin when their labor 
was no longer needed.6 This assumption drove policy that largely neglected any tailored 
efforts to assimilate or integrate workers and their families into the host country, laying 
the foundation for long-term conflict between immigrant communities and host nations as 
immigrants became more invested in their new countries and less inclined to emigrate 
back to their country of origin.7 Between the two countries examined here, this particular 
scenario is most relevant to Germany. 
One period not identified by Hammar’s summary is the apparent change in 
migration forces since the end of the Cold War. Greater openness between Western 
Europe and the former Warsaw Pact nations, especially through EU integration has 
provided new avenues and incentives for movement and entry into Europe. The scale of 
contemporary immigration demonstrates that despite the trend towards more restrictive 
movement of persons since 1974, Europe continues to receive significant numbers of 
immigrants. 
 
5 Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State 1990, 45. 
6 Ibid., 44. 
7 Rystad, “Immigration History and the Future of International Migration” in Migration in European 
History 1996, 559. 
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2. Scale of Immigration 
As previously mentioned, twelve of the EU27 countries account for over 93% of 
the total immigrants within the EU. Germany and Sweden will be the focus of this 
analysis both for their relevance as major immigrant destinations and because they 
employ different policies regarding immigrant enfranchisement. Table 1 shows that these 
countries collectively represent just over 24% of the total EU population. Their collective 
share of the total number of immigrants moving into the European Union in 2006 is over 
one-third, at 35%.  











EU total 493   3,095,506   
Belgium 10.5 2.13% 35,143 1.14%
Czech 
Republic 10.3 2.09% 66,125 2.14%
Germany 82.4 16.71% 558,467 18.04%
Ireland 4.2 0.85% 84,365 2.73%
Greece 11.1 2.25% 86,693 2.80%
Spain 43.8 8.88% 802,971 25.94%
France 63 12.78% 182,390 5.89%
Italy 58.8 11.93% 392,771 12.69%
Netherlands 16.3 3.31% 67,657 2.19%
Austria 8.3 1.68% 85,384 2.76%
Sweden 9 1.83% 80,398 2.60%
United 
Kingdom 60.4 5.88% 451,702 14.59%
Subtotal 378.1   2,894,066   
Subtotal as a 
percentage of 
EU total 76.7%   93.5%   
DE, & SE 
totals 91.4 18.84% 638,865 20.64%
 
                                                 
8 Anne Herm, Population and Social Conditions, Statistical report, Eurostat, European Commission 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2008): 9. European Commission, Total Population - At 1 January, 
January 1, 2009, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001 
(accessed November 4, 2009). 
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The fact that Europe received nearly three million immigrants during a single year 
will have a significant aggregate effect on the demographic makeup of these countries, 
especially when combined with the low fertility rates of the native citizens. Generally, a 
replacement fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary to maintain the population of a developed 
country.9 As illustrated by Table 2, the EU-27 show overall rates of replacement fertility 
well below the necessary level to maintain the current population without immigration. 
Research compiled in 2003 shows that “European fertility is 33% below replacement, 
regardless of which measure of replacement is used.”10 Germany and Sweden demonstrate 
this in varying degrees.11 Germany shows a natural replacement rate that without 
intervention by other influences, would result in a decline in population. Immigration has 
offset the low natural replacement rate since 2000, but the downward trend in immigration 
rates will lead to a downward trend in overall population. Sweden shows a natural change 
rate just below the necessary level to sustain the population, but shows an overall growth 
rate due to immigration, which accounts for 75% of the net gro
Beyond the two countries in question here, Europe’s natural replacement fertility 
rate has been consistently measured at between 1.1 and 1.4 over the past decade, 
sufficiently low that when combined with strong levels of immigration it will necessarily 
shift the demographic makeup of the region over time.12 How these immigrants acquire 
the franchise (or not) within the overall spectrum of assimilation or integration, and their 
projected demographic significance, may also predict the degree to which they will 




9 Thomas J. Espenshade, Juan Carlos Guzman and Charles F. Westoff, "The surprising global 
variation in replacement fertility," Population Research and Policy Review 22, no. 5–6 (December 2003): 
575. 
10 Espenshade et al., "The surprising global variation in replacement fertility," 579. 
11 Eurostat, "Data in Focus: EU-27 population continues to grow - Issue 31/2009," European 
Commission: Eurostat: Statistics in Focus: Data in Focus, August 3, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
(accessed December 16, 2009). 
12 Eurostat, "Data in Focus: EU-27 population continues to grow - Issue 31/2009.". Espenshade et al., 
"The surprising global variation in replacement fertility," 580. 
 
 
Table 2.   EU-27 rates of population change13 
 
                                                 
13 Eurostat, "Data in Focus: EU-27 population continues to grow - Issue 31/2009." 
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3. Political Impact of Immigrants 
The political impact of immigrants in Europe is an evolving facet of 
contemporary immigration and its effects. The following discussion relies on the work of 
Mark Miller to challenge the standing assumptions about immigrant participation in the 
political process in Western Europe.  
Despite significant levels of immigration in Europe dating back to the end of the 
Second World War, the question of immigrant political participation has been largely 
neglected. Mark Miller writes that immigrants are often viewed strictly as “economic 
agents,” owing to the very nature of their recruitment to fill labor shortages in the postwar 
economic era.14 This assumption relies on the belief, “that postwar migrations would be 
temporary market adjustments and that the sojourn of individual migrants in Western 
Europe would be short-term as migrants; once they had amassed sufficient savings or else 
had lost their jobs during recession, they would return home.”15  
The assumption and expectation that immigrants would conveniently return to 
their home countries, however, never materialized, especially in the German case. This 
assumption began to be openly challenged by the 1970s, but it had already provided a 
strong foundation for excluding immigrants from the political process. Because of the 
assumption about the nature and short duration of immigration to Western Europe, little 
consideration was given to policies for integrating immigrants into the political process, 
or into the host society as a whole. Miller writes: 
By 1970, as the ‘myth of return’ began to dissipate and the permanency of 
foreign worker production in Western Europe became apparent, the 
sociocultural dimensions of foreign worker policy were discovered. The 
soon burgeoning literature on migrant worker living conditions and 
adaptation problems revealed little prospect for significant foreign worker 
political role, unless their oppression was seen as shoring up the Western 
capitalist order. The defining elements of the foreign worker conditions, 
among them illiteracy and language barriers; an inferior legal status; 
sociocultural alienation; substandard wages, working conditions and 
 
14 Miller, The Political Impact of Foreign Labor: A Re-evaluation of the Western European 
Experience, Vol. 2, in Migration in European History, 149. 
15 Ibid. 
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housing; high accident rates; and the pervasive discrimination they 
encountered, were seen as precluding a significant degree of migrant 
worker political engagement or influence.16 
These barriers to integration, and the lesser legal status of immigrants also present 
another barrier to political participation: residency insecurity. Miller notes that aside from 
an example in Germany during a recession in 1967, there has not been any systematic 
denial of permits for workers to remain and work.17 The uncertainty these workers face 
regarding their residency, or the perception of risk and uncertainty regarding their 
residency contributes to a tendency for immigrant “political expression to be oblique and 
nonorthodox as compared to that of citizens. . . . While residency insecurity inhibits 
migrant political expression, it may also be a radicalizing factory.”18 This may be further 
compounded by expectations of political participation due to the fact that workers in 
many countries are able to participate in the politics of their unions and workers 
associations.19 
Just as frustration over denied political participation may act as an influence of 
radicalization, learned and observed behavior of political participation by immigrants 
may also have an important effect on the immigrant sending countries. In cases where 
immigrants do not become naturalized citizens, or in which they are allowed to establish 
dual citizenship be retaining citizenship in their country of origin, they are still 
technically part of the political process of their country of origin. Increased 
communication to their country of origin through travel, satellite television, and other 
electronic means allows them to remain engaged in the political developments there even 
while residing in Europe. Access to consular services, as well as their relative economic 
power also allows them the potential to participate as voters and influence the political 
process, and how emigration affects political sentiments of this population group is 
 
16 Miller, The Political Impact of Foreign Labor: A Re-evaluation of the Western European 
Experience, Vol. 2, in Migration in European History, 150. 
17 Ibid., 154.  
18 Ibid., 155. 
19 Ibid., 156. 
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fraught with significance to homeland governments.20 One of the ironies in this 
discussion is that “despite their limited political rights in Western Europe, foreign 
workers often have more freedom of political expression abroad than at home[i.e., their 
native land]. Hence, it is not surprising to find political opposition groups active in every 
major emigrant worker community.”21  
This greater freedom to participate politically in Europe versus the countries of 
origin also has generated concerns within Europe as the potential foreign political 
extremism and belligerent political activities could spillover from the home countries into 
Europe.22  
Ultimately, the question at hand is how these immigrants gain equal access to the 
ballot box within their country of residence. Whatever form that path takes, it is clear that 
immigrants have the potential to significantly influence the political process for their 
countries of residence as well as exert influence on their countries of origin. 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS  
Many Western European states have become immigrant importers reversing long 
historical trends as net people exporters. Access from former colonial possessions, 
generous policy towards refugees and persons in need of subsidiary protection, as well as 
economic émigrés from Eastern European states and other areas throughout the world 
have created a flood of new immigrants into Europe. In addition, the implementation of 
the Schengen Treaty provides unprecedented mobility for persons within the EU, 
including immigrants from outside the EU. There is no uniform basis for extending 
voting rights to immigrants within the European Union. 
States vary in the legal justification they use to extend or restrict suffrage to 
citizens and where applicable, non-residents. In many cases, naturalization is the 
prerequisite for exercising any voting rights. In the cases where citizenship is the 
 
20 Miller, The Political Impact of Foreign Labor: A Re-evaluation of the Western European 
Experience, Vol. 2, in Migration in European History, 157–158. 
21 Ibid.,164. 
22 Ibid., 165. 
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prerequisite to voting, concepts regarding what it means to be a citizen and what 
conditions must be met by immigrants to gain citizenship are just as varied across the EU. 
The challenge then, will be to survey relevant EU nations, and survey their 
individual approaches with respect to voting rights for immigrants. What historical forces 
have shaped voting rights within these countries? Do they require persons to become 
citizens, and if so, what are the barriers to citizenship within these countries? Finally, are 
there greater barriers for entry for immigrants from outside the EU than inside, and if so, 
why? 
Western European countries will likely maintain their own, historically unique 
policies for granting immigrants the right to vote. Each nation employs different 
standards for voting rights, defines citizenship differently, and provides a unique path to 
naturalization. Some pressure for convergence towards common policy may exist, but the 
legal and political traditions that define each nation are not easily pushed aside in favor of 
changes to provide easier access to voting. Despite the adoption of a single legal standard 
for persons in need of state protection but do not fulfill the requirements of being 
designated a refugee under the so called Qualification Directive for Subsidiary 
Protection, little change has been observed in the treatment of persons seeking 
protection.23  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The challenge inherent to the existing literature is that so much has been written 
on democratic phenomena in Europe, yet the question at hand touches more than one 
academic discipline and several topics of existing research. The democratic process, 
immigration, assimilation, integration, concepts of citizenship, the rise of nationalism, 
and globalization are all relevant processes and phenomena to this question. Historical 
writings document the events and movements that have changed Europe from medieval 
monarchies to the liberal democracies of today. Political science has added much to  
 
 
23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the 
Implementation of the Qualification Directive, The UN Refugee Agency (Brussels: UNHCR, 2007): 13.  
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understand the evolving nature of voter preferences throughout Europe. In general, 
voters’ preferences were a result of growing nationalism, the rise of mass politics and the 
evolution of cultural preferences.  
Amongst the trove of research and analysis already available lies one important 
limitation: within the available academic writing there is an abject lack of analysis on the 
process for immigrants to gain voting rights. Significant research on migration, 
integration and assimilation buttress the wealth of knowledge on the topics already 
introduced, but only occasionally do these works mention the question of voting, and 
then only in passing. Grouped according to the relevant country, the following is a 
sampling of the strengths and limitations of the available literature for Germany and 
Sweden. 
The German case centers on citizenship, as this is the prerequisite for suffrage.  
Rogers Brubaker is the leading authority and voice regarding German nationalism. His 
analysis covers the concept of what it means to be a member of a given nation and how 
that drives policy formulation for citizenship, immigration, and integration. Brubaker, 
Hagen Schulze, and others have written extensively on the formation of German 
nationalism from the perspectives of political scientists and historians. These works 
provide a clear foundation for understanding the evolutionary underpinnings of German 
policy regarding immigrants and the nature of their inclusion or exclusion from the 
benefits of the German state. Brubaker also contrasts this against the French experience, 
showing how differing evolutionary conditions helped each nation not only to develop its 
own identity, but the evolution also influences the form and method of expression of that 
identity. The Volk-oriented German nationalism builds from an ethnocentric foundation 
whereas the liberal French concept of a nation necessarily pushes a French national 
identity for all within the state, regarding race and ethnicity as irrelevant. The question of 
voting in Germany, and in France, is subsumed entirely into the issues and forces 
surrounding integration and citizenship. Tomas Hammar contribution discusses the low 
rates of naturalization in Germany, albeit the Federal Republic. He also examines the 
growing phenomenon of dual citizenship, a relatively new factor in the overall context of 
naturalization and citizenship. 
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The Swedish example contrasts sharply with most of Europe as non-citizen 
residents are able to vote and stand for office in some elections. Diane Sainsbury 
provides a comparative review of immigrant rights in the United States, Germany, and 
Sweden. It demonstrates the strong commitment to immigrant rights within Sweden, 
mentioning the right to vote in local elections for non-citizen residents after only three 
years of residency. Missing, however, is the historical background for understanding why 
there is such a strong commitment to immigrant rights and why suffrage for non-citizens, 
a curiosity comparatively speaking, would be attractive enough to implement. Thomas 
Hammar's writing on the evolution of immigration policy in Sweden recounts effectively 
the events and political supporters for the implementation of legislation regarding 
immigration reform, to include discussion on rights that Swede's wished to extend to 
immigrants. Both of these works fail to identify the source motivation to extend voting 
rights, not just rights in general, to immigrants. Nils Sternquist writes on the development 
of political parties and the suffrage movement, identifying the importance of liberal rights 
and equality in the party platforms for parties that would support generous rights, to 
include voting rights for immigrants. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The relative approaches taken by each of these countries is also an important 
factor in their selection, as they each demonstrate unique foundations for suffrage and 
requirements to exercise voting rights, whether by residency or according to citizenship 
through naturalization. On the surface, Germany is the most restrictive in granting voting 
rights. This is done exclusively through stringent residency, language, and cultural tests 
to qualify for citizenship. Sweden is the least restrictive in that it allows any legal resident 
to vote in local elections after three years, and anyone to apply for citizenship after five 
years of residency, thereby gaining voting rights for national elections. The United 
Kingdom falls between these two countries as it allows persons to vote only after 
becoming citizens, but the with much more relaxed requirements than Germany. Of 
course pursuing the foundations of these different policy approaches is the real goal. 
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In a number of the cases, the evolution of nationalism left strong impressions on 
the legal definitions and standards for citizenship. While the precise details of national 
identity may be similar across different countries and regions, the interpretive perspective 
of the historical narrative can vary widely between neighbors and result in contravening 
policy approaches to adopt immigrants into the national identity and polity. 
Each state will be analyzed in turn, according to the salient influences necessary to 
describe how a given state treats the question of extending voting rights for immigrants. 
The first theme will be the historical development of suffrage in each country. The 
second major theme will be the evolution of citizenship and its conceptual basis and legal 
codification. Third, contemporary immigration is examined and how the historical 
contexts of suffrage and citizenship apply to immigrants and their prospects for voting. 
Finally, overall trends are addressed and findings relative to existing EU efforts to 
institute uniform voting rights, or in the alternative, summarize the positions of the 
individual states to look for possible common ground for standards, rationale, or 
proposed changes that may intimate room for future changes for the EU as a whole. The 
intent is to provide a detailed look at each state before attempting to compare similarities, 
contrast differences, or evaluate EU wide initiatives and trends. 
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II. GERMANY 
A. GERMAN IMMIGRATION HISTORY 
The conventional perception of Germany is that it is not a country of immigration. 
Several writers have noted that, “the political and scholarly debate has tended to focus on 
the fact that the German government has stubbornly failed to recognize officially that the 
“guest-workers” first recruited in the 1950s had become de facto immigrants . . . .”24 The 
perception Germans hold that they are not a country of immigrants is supported by 
Germany’s history prior to the middle of the nineteenth century. Since that time, 
however, Germany has clearly become an immigrant destination. The importance of 
understanding the actual scope and history of immigration to Germany is that German 
politics only very recently acknowledged that Germany is a country of immigration, and 
that policies for immigration and naturalization have not accounted for the very real 
presence of long-term foreign-born residents, their offspring, or newly arrived 
immigrants. Because Germans do not consider themselves and immigrant country, they 
do not extend enfranchisement based on residency, nor do they reconsider the basis for 
citizenship and voting qualifications that rely on jus sanginis. What is behind the 
perception and politics that Germany is not an immigrant country? 
Germany has a record of strong emigration, especially to the United States. By the 
time emigration flows largely ended by the mid-twentieth century, “nearly 8 million 
Germans emigrated (sic) to the United States,” pushed by a, “disproportion between 
population growth and employment opportunities. . . .”25 The end of large scale 
emigration after the Second World War was not the first time German emigration ended,  
 
 
24 Barbara Schmitter-Heisler, Contents of Immigrant Incorporation: Locating Dimensions of 
Opportunities and Constraints in the United States and Germany, Vol. 14 (Part b), in Industrial 
Development and the Social Fabric: An International Series of Historical Monographs, ed. Herman 
Kurthan, Jurgen Filajkowski and Gert T. Wagner, 91-106 (Stamford: JAI Press Inc., 1998): 92. 
25 Klaus J. Bade, Immigration and Integration in GermanySsince 1945, Vol. 1, in Migration in 
European History, 459-463 (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1996): 459. Hartmut Esser 
and Hermann Korte, "Federal Republic of Germany," in European Immigration Policy: A Comparative 
Study, ed. Tomas Hammar, 165-205 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 165–166. 
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nor was it the first time Germany faced the need for immigration to satiate labor needs. 
Remarkably, the historical range and scope of immigration to Germany is just as 
impressive as the well-known emigration.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, labor shortages explain why Germany 
experienced more immigration than emigration. The first of these shortages occurred in 
eastern Prussia in the agricultural sector as early as the 1870s.26 What evolved by the end 
of the century as labor shortages became more acute was a policy of importing Poles, but 
with an annual Karenzzeit period when they would be required to return to Poland in 
order to prevent them from taking up residence long-term in Germany, as well as 
restrictions on movement from the agricultural East to the western regions of Germany.27 
Additional labor shortages would expand the involvement of Polish workers and others to 
309,000 workers in Prussia alone by 1908.28 Overall, the involvement of foreign workers 
would reach “1.2 million on the eve of World War I.”29 During the war this would grow 
with an additional 700,000 Poles, recruited voluntarily to work in Germany, but barred 
from leaving once they had arrived.30 Additionally, “a large number of Hungarians and 
about 150,000 Belgians were forced to work in the German war economy.”31 The 
memory of significant emigration contrasting with the history of temporary foreign 
laborers during World War I, and the more than 8 million temporary laborers used during 
World War II may reinforce two important perceptions among Germans: that Germany is 
not and has not been an immigrant nation, and that large influxes of non-German 
immigration can be temporary and passing.  
The postwar situation was that by the early 1960s, Germany needed additional 
labor to continue with the “economic miracle,” and the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
with Spain, Greece, and Turkey ushered in “the beginning of the “uncontrolled 
 
26 Esser and  Korte, "Federal Republic of Germany,"166.  
27 Ibid., 166. 
28 Ibid., 167. 
29 Bade, Immigration and integration in Germany since 1945, 459. 
30 Esser and  Korte, "Federal Republic of Germany," 168. 
31 Ibid. 
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expansion” of immigrant labor. . . .”32 This influx of workers would continue largely 
unabated until 1973, interrupted only by a pause in the renewal of work permits during 
the recession of 1966–67. There are two items of particular note during this period. The 
first is the passage of the Aliens Act of 1965, which established the legal foundation for a 
tenuous residence status for every immigrant. It established “broad discretionary powers 
and does not grant foreigners any legal rights to residence.”33 This law was the dominant 
legal guidance for immigration policy until the Foreigner’s Law went into effect in 1990. 
The second item was a recruitment stop in 1973 of foreign workers due to overall rising 
unemployment. While this led the number of foreign workers to drop by about a third by 
1978, the number of foreign residents actually held steady and then began to increase, 
partly due to a policy of family reunification, which allowed foreign residents to bring 
their families to Germany. The second reason is that foreign workers recognized the 
recruitment stop. As a result, “more and more immigrants (did) not consider returning 
home because they fear that they will not be permitted to remigrate. . .once they have 
left.”34 This would be the dominant trend in immigration until the end of the Cold War, 
except that Germany allowed ethnic Germans from elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
Aussiedler, to immigrate to Germany and establish full rights of citizenship almost 
immediately.35  
With the end of the Cold War, the 1990 Foreigner’s Law becomes an immediate 
anachronism, as it “was not sufficient to cope with the extraordinary situation after the 
fall of the Berlin wall . . . Germany faced a massive influx of immigrants with the right to 
housing and basic income . . . .”36 Despite this, and the increases in immigration 
consequent to further integration by the European Union, Grete Brochman points out that 
the German government did not consider Germany to be an immigration destination. She 
 
32 Esser and  Korte, "Federal Republic of Germany," 170.  
33 Ibid., 170. 
34 Ibid., 173. Cyrus and Vogel, "Germany," in European Immigration: A Sourcebook, 128. 
35 Bade, Immigration and integration in Germany since 1945, 461. Sainsbury 2006: "Immigrants' 
social rights in comparative perspective: welfare regimes, forms in immigration and immigration policy 
regimes," 234 
36 Cyrus and Vogel, "Germany," in European Immigration: A Sourcebook, 128. 
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writes, “German alien policy is, however, not meant to indicate that Germany is willing 
to define itself as an immigration country. According to Ursula Mehrländer, the 
government sees this as a unique historical experience which should not be repeated.”37 
The predominance of emigration in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the 
repatriation of temporary labor after the two world wars have long influenced the popular 
belief and consequent policies that Germany is not a country of immigration. Despite 
this, Germany is and has clearly been an immigrant destination for quite some time. By 
the mid 1990s, the majority of the immigrant population in Germany had been there for 
20 years or more, along with a growing second and third generation.38 Indeed,  
Experts estimate that about 30 percent of he population residing in 
Germany was born abroad or has ancestors which immigrated to Germany 
after 1945. Only with the passing of the new Immigration Act in 2005 did 
the official position acknowledge that immigration takes place and should 
be properly managed and statistically counted in the future. Moreover, the 
integration of newcomers with the perspective to stay should be promoted 
along with more secure residence rights and integration courses.39 
The acknowledgement that Germany had become a country of immigration 2005, 
as part of the Immigration Act, was the first such official admission despite debate on the 
subject dating back to the 1970s. Because German governments finally acknowledged the 
reality of long-term immigration, how does that acknowledgment shape policy? Have 
policies obstructed or facilitated the path to voting for immigrants?  The answers to these 
questions will have a profound long-term affect on the character and makeup of German 
politics. 
B. SUFFRAGE IN GERMANY 
Germany experienced universal male suffrage relatively early in Europe. “On a 
cold day in March 1871, the new German Empire held its first elections based on direct, 
 
37  Grete Brochman, European Integration and Immigation from Third Countries (Boston: 
Scandinavian University Press, 1996): 118. 
38 Schmitter-Heisler, Contents of Immigrant Incorporation: Locating Dimensions of Opportunities and 
Constraints in the United States and Germany, 92. 
39 Cyrus and Vogel, "Germany," in European Immigration: A Sourcebook, 127. 
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equal, manhood suffrage – the most progressive franchise in Europe.”40 The franchise 
would be extended to women near the end of World War I, consistent with the adoption 
of universal suffrage in a number of other European countries.  
As will be seen with the discussion on citizenship law in Germany, the 
establishment of universal male suffrage in Germany was part and parcel to the rise of 
nationalism in Germany. The legal and conceptual framework for understanding the 
German approach to voting was established during the nineteenth century. The influence 
of the rise of nationalism and the efforts of Chancellor Bismarck to expand and 
consolidate the political influence of Prussia have a significant impact on the legal 
precedents that will shape laws and expectations about voting during the twentieth 
century.  
The introduction of universal male suffrage can seem oddly out of place 
considering the circumstances. Why would a chancellor, officiating on behalf of a 
monarch, and not beholden to the parliament except for money, potentially weaken his 
own power by introducing such a progressive democratic principle? Bismarck, of course, 
is not appointed chancellor with a mandate to introduce democracy to Germany. Instead, 
Bismarck faced the same challenge as other rulers in Europe, namely how to perpetuate 
the monarchy, the source of his power, while preventing revolution, its excesses, and 
general instability as had been seen in France. He faced an environment of rising 
parliamentarianism, sponsored by a growing middle class, restless to exercise greater 
political freedom and power, and a fractious German Confederation of thirty-nine states. 
Within the German Confederation, Prussia and Austria were the principle antagonists in a 
bid to unify the various German states into one. This is the general backdrop for 
Bismarck’s first democratic reform. 
Bismarck sought to dominate the German Confederation and marginalize Austria. 
To do so, he needed the support of liberal nationalists within Prussia, “and in April 1866 
(he) put forward a proposal for federal reform. This was truly revolutionary: Bismarck 
 
40 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "Voter, Junker, Landrat, Priest: The Old Authorities and the New 
Franchise in Imperial Germany," The American Historical Review (American Historical Association) 98, 
no. 5 (December 1993): 1448. 
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the conservative was seeking an alliance with the nationalists, calling for a German 
parliament with universal manhood suffrage, and for the expulsion of Austria from the 
Confederation.”41 The genius (or luck) in this maneuver was that on the same day that 
Prussia soundly defeats Austria at the battle of Könniggrätz, Prussian elections are held 
and, “resulted in a crushing defeat for the liberals.”42 It should be noted here that the 
liberals did not form a unified whole as a political party, and the liberals who suffered the 
greatest defeats were those who opposed the war with Austria. Furthermore, the resulting 
peace allowed Bismarck to dictate the formation of a North German confederation, which 
Prussia dominated, and a series of defensive alliances with the German states to the 
south. Four years later, Bismarck is able to deftly play the French, under Napoleon III, to 
declare war on Prussia and trigger the defensive alliances of the southern states.43 The 
ensuing victory over the French allowed Bismarck to enter into treaties with the southern 
German states and elevating the King of Prussia, William, to German Emperor.44 The 
elections of 1871, the first for universal manhood suffrage throughout Germany, took 
place just a few days after the Treaty of Frankfurt officially ended the Franco-Prussian 
War.45 “They affirmed the results of the battlefield that had made possible the creation of 
a unified German nation-state.”46 Furthermore, “Bismarck had calculated that universal 
manhood suffrage would enfranchise a conservative peasantry, as had been the case in 
Napoleon III’s France. . . .”47 More important than the question of enfranchisement is the 
acceleration and harnessing of German nationalism that occurred both as a result of the 
two wars, but also because of the resulting Imperial German nation-state. Kitchen writes, 
“German nationalism underwent a dramatic change in 1871. Where nationalism had once  
 
 
41  Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 110. 
42 Ibid., 113. 
43 Ibid., 118. 
44 Ibid., 120–121. 
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46 Ibid., 158. 
47 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 144. 
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been a progressive force aimed at sweeping away the old regime and furthering the cause 
of constitutional liberties, it was now conservative and bent on maintaining the status quo 
in a militarized Prussian Germany.”48 
The inevitable conflict came about in Prussia, where the plans for unification 
were hatched and executed. There, as elsewhere throughout Germany, the essential 
qualification for voting was citizenship. In Prussia’s case this meant a considerable 
number of ethnic Poles could vote. This would not have been a problem except for three 
important factors. The first is that Bismarck and Prussian authorities pursued policies that 
alienated the ethnically Polish German citizens as part of the Kulturkampf in the 1870s.49 
These citizens had progressed somewhat towards cultural assimilation in terms of 
language, but laws passed under the rubric of Polenpolitik to further this process along 
caused understandable nationalistic backlash from ethnic Poles.50 The second came when 
Germany needed to import additional labor to support economic growth, and it turned 
eastward for Polish workers. Initially, the method to control the potential political 
influence of these Poles was to require that they return during the Karenzzeit period, 
effectively preventing the establishment of long-term residency. As the need for these 
workers spread beyond seasonal agricultural help, the only way to guarantee that these 
people would not be able to join the Polish voting block in a given electoral district was 
to restrict their franchise. Because Bismarck had long before set the precedent for 
qualifications to vote as any male, 25 years of age, with certain standards of civic 
responsibility, but without respect to ethnicity, revisiting qualifications for voting was out 
of the question. This led to the third important factor to preserving Germanic influence in 
politics: eliminating any connection between residency and citizenship when drafting the 
citizenship law in 1913. This was another important precedent that would take on the 
weight of national identity during the twentieth century. 
 
48 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 128. 
49  Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992): 129. 
50 Ibid., 130–132. 
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C. CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY 
German citizenship has its foundations prior to the existence of modern Germany. 
Awakened by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s armies, “the idea of the sovereign 
nation of the people began a triumphant advance across Europe. In Germany it 
encountered another idea and combined with it—the idea of the nation as a collective 
body sharing a common language and culture.”51 Because the Germanic peoples were 
formerly spread throughout numerous principalities and states, they developed solidarity 
independent of the political borders. Despite political borders that separated Germanic 
peoples, there was a greater affinity between them as a people than with non-Germanic 
citizens within these different states, reflected in the pan-German movement to form a 
German nation-state.52 The combination of a multitude of political boundaries presented 
challenges for forming a unified state, even with an ethnically and linguistically related 
people. Germans were spread across different states, but these states sometimes also 
included other ethnic groups. Rogers Brubaker sums up the dilemma of forming a 
German state: 
The German ethnocultural conception of nationhood was a product of the 
distinctive political and cultural geography of central Europe. Yet a 
feature of the geography – the inextricable intermixture of Germans and 
other nationalities – made it impossible to found a German state precisely 
on ethnocultural nation (Conze 1983: 95; Lepsius 1985: 48). None of the 
proposed solutions to the problem of national unification – including the 
‘classical’ Prussian-kleindeutsch and Austrian-grossdeutsch solutions – 
could bring into being a ‘perfect’ nation-state: either Germans would be 
excluded, or non-Germans included, or both.53 
The reference to kleindeutsch or grossdeutsch solutions refers to what physical 
form a German state would take. Prussia and Austria were the two most influential and 
powerful of the many German states and competed for leadership and advantage within 
the German Confederation of states. Kleindeutsch refers to a smaller German state, 
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excluding Austria because of its position within the Hapsburg Empire, covering present 
day Austria and all or part of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, 
Ukraine, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Italy. Grossdeutsch referred to a German state 
solution including Austria. Even without the inclusion of Austria, the kleindeutsch 
solution would necessarily include non-Germans, primarily via Prussia. 
Because the Germanic peoples were spread throughout numerous principalities 
and states, they developed solidarity independent of political borders. Prussia provides an 
example of this sense of Germanic solidarity independent of a particular state. Eastern 
Prussia contained non-Germanic peoples that were also citizens. The differences in 
language, as with the Poles, or heritage in the case of the Jews, led the Prussian Germans 
to coalesce into a shared sense of Germanic identity.  The sense of what it meant to be 
German necessarily excluded Jews and Poles. Despite political borders separating 
Germanic peoples, pan-German kinship bonded them as a people to the exclusion of non-
Germanic citizens within these different states. With the eventual consolidation of a 
German state under Bismarck, and the rise of even greater nationalistic forces in 
Germany, it “required the civic exclusion rather than the civic incorporation” of other 
groups in order to strengthen the sense of nationalism.54 Grete Brochman explains the 
role of the nation-state in this phenomenon: 
The ultimate control of the innermost gate in relation to “aliens” is 
represented by the institution of citizenship. Every modern state delineates 
its citizenry by establishing who belongs and who does not. Through this 
dual inclusion/exclusion exercise, the members of the state are identified, 
and their rights and duties sorted out accordingly. The modern state 
secures legal equality for its members, which means equal access to the 
benefits of state, and equal political, civil, and social rights. Citizenship is, 
however, not a pure reflection of rights attached to residency. It provides, 
when achieved, a persisting personal status, independent of temporary or 
prolonged absence. The modern state thus serves as an enduring 
“membership organization.55 
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Brubaker identifies the causal linkage in Germany thus: “Because national feeling 
developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally, a 
political one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea of citizenship.”56 Separating 
citizenship conceptually from the German identity provides an important foundation for 
understanding the nature of legally defined citizenship. Brubaker completes the logical 
arguments thus: 
This was the age of nationalism, and defining the citizenry as a 
community of descent, following the principle of jus sanguinis, was self-
evidently preferable to defining the citizenry as a territorial community, 
following the principle of jus soli. Jus soli was rejected as a feudal 
principle that based membership on ties to the soil, jus sanguini preferred 
as a specifically national principle, which would found the nation on ties 
of kinship that were more substantial and more enduring than the 
superficial and external ties of common birth-place.57 
The explanation that German citizenship used jus sanguini as the guiding 
principle for citizenship when the law was first formulated in 1870 is not all that 
revolutionary, similar arguments were made in France during the same period, due to a 
combination of heightened immigration and growing nationalism, but the complete 
absence of any sense of jus soli is unusual.58 Brubaker adds: 
There was no debate about whether the basic principle of jus sanguinis 
ought to be supplemented by elements of jus soli. That the question did 
not even arise is not surprising. In 1871 there were only about 200,000 
foreigners in Germany out of a total population of 40 million, and there 
was no reason to expect substantial immigration in the future. . . The 
demographic vigor of the country – in the 1870s births exceeded deaths by 
about half a million per year – obviated the need for immigration. . . There 
was thus no reason to consider introducing elements of jus soli to 
complement the basic principle of jus sanguinis.59 
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In practice, this allowed the exclusion of Karenzzeit Poles temporarily residing in 
eastern Prussia, even as their temporary status grew into long-term residency, and this 
despite the fact that there were ethnically Polish citizens in Prussia since before the 
establishment of Imperial Germany.60 This is also consistent with the increased 
expression of nationalism present amongst Germans as they formed a German nation-
state. 
The debate leading up to the citizenship law of 1913 reinforces the increased 
exclusivity of the concept of German citizenship to ethnic Germans. This debate also 
occurs at the same time that Germany transitions from strong forces of German 
emigration, to strong non-German immigration. “Alone among European states, Germany 
had both a substantial immigrant population (roughly three and a half million) and a 
substantial immigrant population . . . .”61 The combination of a large German diaspora 
and increased immigration led to movement to strengthen the tie between the German 
Volk and citizenship. This included changes to the citizenship law that allowed emigrated 
Germans to retain their citizenship, and in a specific reinforcement of the principle of jus 
sanguinis, to pass on German citizenship to their children born outside Germany.62 
Furthermore, the principle of blood relation for citizenship was so completely inculcated 
that even the question of what to do with orphans whose parentage could not be readily 
determined was decided by establishing the legal presumption that such children were 
presumed to be “the child of a citizen of that state.”63 Despite many attempts by the 
Social Democrats, no allowance in the slightest was made for jus soli. This included not 
only the presumption provided for orphans with unknown parentage, but also a rejection 
of even provisional citizenship for the second or third generation of immigrants born in 
Germany.64 
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Brubaker asserts that, “The vehement repudiation of every trace of jus soli 
reflected the lack of elite confidence in the social, cultural, and political transformation of 
immigrants into Germans.”65 It also reflects an exclusionary conception of what it means 
to be German, and that concept is tied directly to the extension of citizenship. This is 
important because it provides the necessary legal foundation for German citizenship to 
become exclusive to ethnic Germans once the Nazis completed their ethnic cleansing of 
Germany from Poles and Jews. Obviously there was legal precedence for citizenship of 
ethnic non-Germans, but once these had been removed during the course of Nazi racial 
policies there was little to prevent the postwar government from using the jus sanguini 
standard to reassert the foundation for the Federal Republic’s citizenship law. Brubaker 
provides a clear summation of the conflict between geography and ethnicity and the 
endorsement of jus sanguini by the postwar German government: 
While Germany would look to expand the ranks of German citizens in the 
postwar period, the 1953 Law on Expelled Persons and Refugees 
reinforced the jus sanguini definition of German Volk, using the criteria of 
“descent, speech, upbringing, and culture” to effectively extend rights of 
German citizenship to Germanic peoples outside of the Federal 
Republic.66 Even during the labor shortages in the postwar period, the 
question of naturalization for non-Germanic peoples brought in as laborers 
was unfathomable, providing no provision for automatic citizenship for 
even second or third generation children of non-Germans.67  
The contemporary German concept of citizenship is still “Volk-centered and 
differentialist.”68 The Volk-centered definition flows directly from the historical 
development already outlined. Furthermore, differentialist refers to an inherent 
acknowledgment that different groups are and will remain different. It is a conceptual 
extension of the exclusive nature of what it means to be German, that is, the German 
identity that existed before and independent of the German state. Little thought is given 
to assimilation and none towards integration because the first reflects the implicit lack of 
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confidence to become German already named, and the second would defy the very 
essence of what makes them different groups. Differentialist policy in Germany is the 
marriage of the cultural conceptions of what it means to be German with a legal 
codification of that understanding. The clearest manifestations of this line of thinking 
were on display during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the debate raged 
over changes to the citizenship law first established by Bismarck in 1870. Brubaker 
writes: “It was this hard nationality struggle—this standoff between mobilized and 
opposed nationalisms—that formed the backdrop to the revision of the citizenship law, 
especially to the debates about jus soli and naturalization policy.”69 Once the Imperial 
German government modified the citizenship law exclusively on the basis of jus 
sanguinis, it set an important legal precedent affecting all future prospects of gaining the 
franchise by immigrants. Writing in 1992, Brubaker expresses just how out of place the 
emphasis on jus sanguinis had become: 
German citizenship today remains governed by a law of the Wilhelmine 
period. As a result of this continuity across two World Wars, three regime 
changes, and the division and reunification of the country, the marked 
restrictiveness of citizenship law toward non-German immigrants was 
carried over from Wilhelmine Germany into the Federal Republic and, in 
1990, into the new German nation-state. The 1913 system of pure jus 
sanguinis, with no trace of jus soli, continues to determine the citizenship 
status of immigrants and their descendents today. In recent years, as a 
substantial second-generation immigrant population – and now the 
beginnings of a third generation – has developed, the system of pure jus 
sanguinis has become increasingly anomalous.70 
Volk-centered thinking thus produced two important conceptual and legal 
precedents that remain largely intact today. The first was the extension of universal 
suffrage only to citizens in order to exclude and limit the voice of foreign labor that was 
temporarily or permanently residing in Germany. The second was the establishment of 
citizenship law exclusively on the basis of ethnic blood relations, or jus sanguini. These 
two foundations of voting eligibility remain very much in force today and provide a 
contextual foundation for the differentialist policies of Germany today. 
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Rogers Brubaker describes the German differentialist attitude towards citizenship 
and full legal integration into Germany thus: “To take on German citizenship, in the self-
understanding of Germans and Turks alike, requires that one become German in some 
thicker, richer sense than merely acquiring a new passport.”71 This understanding drives 
policy formulation, especially with regards to the extension of citizenship. To this end, 
German law has provided a path to citizenship for immigrants, albeit with very high 
standards for obtaining citizenship and voting rights. Prior to the Immigration Act of 
2005, immigrants became eligible for “discretionary naturalization” after ten years of 
residence and could then apply for citizenship after fifteen years. Applicants also faced 
the necessity of renouncing any previous citizenship.72 Despite the fact that these 
guidelines are significant obstacles for immigrants, in clear opposition to the volume and 
scope of postwar immigration and the extensive long-term settlement of guest workers, 
they have nevertheless “taken on the inertial weight and normative dignity of 
tradition.”73 This is not surprising when compared with the policies towards Poles dating 
back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, providing a legal conduit 
to acquire citizenship at all is a significant step forward when one considers the abject 
rejection of any such stipulations when the citizenship law of 1913 was put in place. The 
barriers for non-German immigrants become all the more egregious when compared to 
“Ethnic German immigrants (Aussidler) [that] could claim citizenship upon arrival in 
Germany.”74 The larger historical context shows that this prejudice towards ethnic 
Germans, and an emphasis on assimilation-oriented behavior is not new. The 1908 
Reichsvereinsgeset, directed against the growing influence of Polish workers in the Ruhr 
district, mandated German as the official language of all organizations.75 This is 
significant because in this particular case, these Poles were already citizens, and they 
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constituted as much as one third of the labor force in the Ruhr district.76 It is not 
surprising, however, as Bismarck’s Kulturkampf was also directed against the influence 
of Poles who were already citizens in Prussia and Germany.  
The 2005 act relaxed some requirements for naturalization, and introduced limited 
application of jus soli.77 The act reduced the legal residency requirements to eight years, 
seven if a person has completed integration courses. The requirement for legal residency 
is not the only requirement, and other criteria exist that could either be viewed as 
indoctrination or integration measures for immigrants. Viewed with a perspective of the 
foundations of the concept of the German Volk and the establishment of the citizenship 
law, these requirements are consistent with an approach that seeks to perpetuate the 
exclusive German Volk. Proficiency in German, a citizenship test, a statement of 
allegiance, and the renouncement of citizenship from any other countries all fall in line 
with reinforcing and becoming part of the German people in order to become a German 
citizen. Other requirements are more purely pragmatic, such as a source of income 
independent of unemployment or welfare benefits. The question of discretionary 
naturalization, along with administration of the integration classes, and language 
proficiency, all rest with the immigration authority in each Land within Germany, 
allowing “broad discretionary powers in applying the regulations passed on the Federal 
level.”78 The most significant allowance in the law for ethnic non-German immigrants is 
for those married to German citizens or in a civil partnership. These immigrants are 
eligible for citizenship after three years of residency, of which two must be while married 
or in a registered partnership. 79 The nature of these requirements, especially the 
emphasis on learning German and understanding civic responsibility all hearken back to 
the rigid application of jus sanguini, requiring immigrants to join the German family as it 
were, in order to become citizens and be able to exercise voting rights. The net effect is 
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that several other immigrant-receiving nations dwarf rates of naturalization for 
immigrants to Germany. “Taking Germany as a base, foreign residents naturalize at a rate 
four times higher in France, ten times higher in the United States, fifteen times higher in 
Sweden, and over twenty times higher in Canada.”80 
In conclusion, Germany extends rights of citizenship and voting based on 
membership in the German Volk, expressed in language, culture, and most of all, ethnic 
heritage. German history established the Volk sense during the rise of nationalism and 
codified the legal definition for citizenship on this basis in the early twentieth century. 
Both legal standards for eligibility for citizenship and voting reflect the explicit desire to 
extend the dual privileges of citizenship and enfranchisement to Germans exclusively, 
forcing immigrants to become as German as possible, through language and residency 
requirements before receiving citizenship. Becoming German is a fulfillment of the jus 
sanguinis principle to define citizenship, and perhaps because of the involved process and 
exclusive mindset Germans have towards extending the mantel of citizen, the rate at 
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III. SWEDEN 
A. SUFFRAGE IN SWEDEN 
The Swedish approach towards immigration and integration has been a natural 
outgrowth of other egalitarian social policies within the state. There is a strong emphasis 
on multicultural acceptance, accommodation, and the extension of rights to minorities. As 
will be explained later, this includes a degree of voting rights for non-citizens residents, 
and relatively easy requirements for citizenship. The extension of voting rights not tied 
purely to citizenship is in stark contrast to the approach in Germany. In contrast to 
Germany, where voting is based on citizenship and citizenship uses jus sanguinis for its 
foundation, Sweden bases both citizenship and voting rights on the principle of jus 
domicili. Because Sweden uses jus domicili, it extended citizenship on the basis of 
residency and progressed to add voting rights based on residency as well. The 
foundations for this approach lie mostly in the political alignments that formed the 
majority governments in the twentieth century, but the formative process for Swedish 
democracy in the nineteenth century also plays an important part in establishing the 
progressive direction for these parties, and in influencing important legal precedents to 
protect and extend rights to non-Swedish residents.  
The genesis of Swedish democracy and political parties comes about with the 
establishment of the constitution of 1809 and the reforms on the parliamentary system 
later in the century. Sweden began the nineteenth century ruled by a monarch beholden to 
no one, and Swedish society still followed the four estates model of organization: 
“nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants.”81 In early 1809, King Gustav IV Adolf was 
forced from power through a coup. The intrigue that followed lasted several months and 
representatives of the four estates drafted a constitution before accepting a new king.82 
While the Riksdag (parliament) was given some power, the king still had the power to 
choose ministers, independent of parliament. This blunted the electoral successes of any 
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opposition party, as the king was not compelled in his selection of ministers in any way. 
Despite the continued power of the king, reformers focused on the electoral process for 
the Riksdag, claiming, “that the Constitution mirrored legal distinctions that were not 
applicable to modern society; and the partial inclusion of new groups could not remedy 
such fundamental errors.”83 
The principal consideration during the ensuing reform debates centered on the 
single largest group in Sweden, the yeomen farmers. Introduction of individual voting 
rights could lead to the yeoman farmers dominating the Riksdag.84 Reformers and 
conservatives considered the bicameral models of the United States, Britain, and Norway 
to mitigate against the potential parliamentary dominance of the fourth estate. The next 
measurable step towards self-government occurred in 1859, when the estates approved 
elections for county councils. Ironically, it had been the fourth estate that had previously 
blocked such a reform due to opposition to new taxes as a qualification to vote.85 Acting 
on a committee recommendation for a bicameral legislative body from 1848, the Riksdag 
would eventually pass a reform bill in 1866.86  
The 1866 reform relied on a municipal law from 1862 to lay out qualifications to 
vote, with some changes. Andersson summarized the requirements to vote established by 
the municipal law: 
A. All Swedish subjects, men and women, who: 
1 were not by court deprived of their citizenship; 
2 resided in the municipality or were taxable there; 
3 were liable to pay taxes; 
4 had no tax debts, which were statute barred after 10 years. 
B. All Swedish limited companies fulfilling A) 2, 3 and 4. 
Further limitations deprived the vote to persons or companies under public 
administration due to debt.87 
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In addition to these basic requirements, voting did not follow a one-person one-
vote model. Instead it followed a model weighted by the wealth of each voter. Andersson 
gives the best explanation: 
The number of votes per person varied according to taxable income for the 
municipal elections. . . For the towns the law stated that nobody could vote 
for more than 2 per cent of the total amount of votes, and that nobody 
could case more than 100 votes in total. No such restrictions applied for 
rural areas. . . .88 
The linkage between taxation and voting provided a distinct advantage for all but 
the fourth estate. In addition to the economic influence, and thus political influence, 
wielded by the wealthy in their communities, the law codified their increased influence in 
the democratic process by allowing their vote to count more than persons that merely met 
the minimum qualifications to vote. Elections for the upper chamber relied on these 
guidelines without any modification. Obviously this provided a degree of protection for 
wealthy interests against the perceived threat of a populist political insurrection by the 
fourth estate. Despite the suspicion involved with extending the franchise, qualifications 
to cast a vote for the lower chamber did not meet what would be considered a particularly 
egalitarian standard compared to the typical standard today. Voting qualifications for the 
lower chamber departed from the municipal law in several ways: 
A. Only men could vote; women and companies were excluded. 
B. One of three qualifications had to be fulfilled, 
1 ownership or tenure of property with a value considerably 
higher than that for the municipal qualification; 
2 a minimum five-year lease of property above a certain 
value; 
3 estimated income twice as high as that set for the municipal 
vote. 
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C. The ballot had to be cast personally, which meant that voting by 
proxy was not allowed. The Municipal Law, on the other hand, stated that 
one vote could be cast by proxy.89 
Despite these reforms, electoral districts with more than one town could still opt 
for indirect election of their representative for the lower chamber. Late publication of the 
law meant that direct elections in 1866 were the exception, and it would be another 
decade before half of rural constituencies would use direct elections.90 Even the adoption 
of direct elections for representatives to the lower chamber did not dramatically change 
the face of politics in Sweden. The reform law of 1866 meant in real terms that, “at the 
end of the nineteenth century only one-quarter of the men over 21 had the vote.”91  
Political parties started to formally organize during the late nineteenth century, 
including the Socialists in 1889, and the Liberal party in 1900. Both of these parties 
campaigned for universal suffrage, but the socialists also represented the disenfranchised 
fourth estate in more than just a campaign to provide voting rights to all. Because the 
fourth estate included the poorest yeomen farmers, broadening suffrage held the promise 
of significant political power for the Socialist party. With the introduction of universal 
suffrage for men in 1909, along with a change to proportional representation for the 
Riksdag, this forced the king to finally begin appointing Liberals and Socialists to 
ministerial positions, and legitimate parliamentarianism developed.92 In 1921, universal 
suffrage extended the vote to women as well, and “the growing number of wage earners 
made it possible for the Socialists to become the largest party.”93 The struggle to gain 
universal suffrage and the desire to extend the vote to women and the working classes 
framed the pattern for voting rights policy of the political left in Sweden. Greater 
extension of voting rights generally benefited the Socialists, and later the Social 
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Democrats, because the disenfranchised were far more likely to come from the working 
poor, which aligned with the natural power base for the party.  
The importance of the struggle for suffrage cannot be overstated. For both the 
Liberals and Socialists, the fight to extend voting rights to everyone marks an almost 
singular point of agreement between the two parties. The combined support of these 
parties and the institutionalized struggle to gain the vote profoundly influences the long-
term consensus throughout Swedish society on the universal extension of rights, 
including rights for non-citizens. As the result of arbitrary deportations in 1914, including 
Jews that had lived in Sweden for several generations, a group of lawyers drew up and 
pushed the passage of, “guarantees for the rights of non-Swedish citizens.”94 These 
guarantees placed the burden of proof on the government to justify the deportation of 
resident foreigners and extended rights of appeal to immigrants. Shortly after this period, 
the Liberals and Socialists ceased their partnership in politics as they worked at cross-
purposes over the future organization of the Swedish economy. From 1932 onward, when 
the Social Democrats form their first majority government, the left is the defining 
influence in Swedish politics. This continued during the postwar period with the coalition 
partner the Centerpartiet, or Center Party.95  
The platform for the Social Democrats centered on workers rights and the 
extension of social justice throughout all levels of society. Because the struggles of the 
Social Democrats had been against the long-standing power of the first, second, and third 
estates in Sweden, a primary tenet for the party was the necessity of equality before the 
law and the extension of rights based on residence rather than on heritage, as had been 
the case prior to universal suffrage. This has a significant impact on the legal and political 
stance taken towards immigrants in general, and naturally leads to policy affecting 
conditions for suffrage and naturalization. 
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The major policy touchstone for immigrants was the establishment of a task force 
on immigration policy in 1965. The commission’s mandate was, in part, to investigate 
and “to determine how foreign citizens could be placed on equal footing with Swedish 
citizens.”96 The results of the investigation were that in 1967, “immigration control was 
tightened and work permits were required prior to arrival in Sweden,” under the rationale 
that “this was necessary to insure that immigrants achieve equal conditions.”97 The 
promised equality became a reality in 1968. Thomas Hammar recounts it thus: 
This was a natural application of an ideology according to which society 
has a responsibility for all of its members and social inequalities should be 
eliminated. Thus immigrants should be accorded the same treatment as 
everyone else. In addition, organized labor has always demanded that 
foreign workers be offered the same employment conditions and wages as 
Swedish workers and should be organized in the same manner. Demands 
for equality have thus long existed in Swedish society . . . .98 
The overall subject of immigration will be addressed in the next section, but it is 
important to point out that in the 1950s and 1960s, a large majority of immigrants to 
Sweden were from other Nordic countries.99 (Figure 2) This is important because of the 
shared historical and cultural ties between Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. The 
four countries had previously existed under a single crown, the Kalmar Union. The 
common heritage and language (except for Finland) provided a shared and common 
identity between these countries. Because of the shared identity, the pursuit of equal 
rights for immigrants, including suffrage, would be a natural extension of the congenial 
relations between the Nordic countries and an affirmation of their shared heritage.  
The position of prominence that Sweden enjoyed in this relationship also makes 
the extension of rights easier. From the time of Swedish independence in 1523 until 
losing the Finnish war to Russia in 1809, Sweden ruled Finland. Similarly, Sweden 
assumed control of Norway, from Denmark in 1814. Such a history could easily provide 
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nationalist antagonism between Swedes and their Nordic neighbors. Two factors mitigate 
this outcome. First, Sweden was the more dominant political force relative to the other 
three nations. Having won Norway from Denmark and been the ruling partner in the 
relationship with both Norway and Finland. Second, in the postwar period, Sweden 
enjoyed the benefits of being the only Nordic country not directly involved in the Second 
World War. Denmark and Norway had each been occupied by Germany, and Finland had 
fought Russia during two different periods during the war.  
Finally, because the development of political parties in the four countries, 
especially the Social Democrats, was virtually identical, they would stand to gain the 
most support from immigrants entering Sweden for employment. Especially because 
these workers would be little more than Social Democrats transplanted from the 
neighboring country. 
 
Figure 1.   Region of origin for immigrants in Sweden 1970100 
The extension of voting rights to immigrants came in the constitutional reforms of 
1975, taking effect with the elections of 1976. With these legal changes, any legal 
                                                 




                                                
resident, citizen or not, could vote and stand for office in local and regional elections 
(city and county), but voting in national elections remained the exclusive right of 
Swedish citizens. Even so, citizens of Nordic countries may become citizens after only 
two years of residency, persons officially classified as refugees may become citizens after 
four years of residency, and all other legal residents may apply for citizenship after five 
years of residency.101 The law instituted in 1976 also dropped knowledge of Swedish as 
a prerequisite for citizenship.102 Children born in Sweden, but not of Swedish parents, 
may be registered as citizens by their parents from birth
The underlying lesson of these reforms is that the salient characteristic for 
understanding the Swedish approach to voting rights is that the “underlying principle has 
been rights based on residence or domicile (jus domicilli) rather than rights based on land 
of birth (jus soli) . . . .”104 Consequently, official residency allows immigrants many of 
the same rights as citizens, including the right to vote and stand for office in local 
elections after only three years of residency, and voting privileges for national elections 
are extended with citizenship.105 Furthermore, the residency requirement to become a 
citizen varies to some degree, but is no more than five years at most, and there is no 
requirement to renounce any previous citizenship, allowing dual citizenship for 
immigrants that do not wish to renounce their previous citizenship.106 It follows then as 
no surprise that Sweden has one of the highest rates of naturalization in the world. “ . . . 
only about a quarter of all persons with immigrant background are foreign citizens, the 
rest hold Swedish or dual citizenship.”107 
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2.110 
Despite all the work to provide legal protections for immigrants, ease the 
requirements to become citizens, and provide voting rights to legal residents after only 
three years, immigrants vote at progressively lower rates than Swedish citizens. In the 
first elections where non-citizen residents could legally vote in 1976, about 60% of 
eligible foreign citizens did so, compared to over 90% of Swedish citizens.108 The level 
of participation over the next ten years declined to only 48% amongst foreign citizens 
whilst 88% of Swedes continued to vote.109 (See Figure 2) The downward trend has 
since continued, and only 38% of eligible foreign citizens voted in 200
 
Turnout among Election 
year 
Number of foreigners 
entitled to vote foreigners Swedes 
1976 219,000 59.9% 90.5% 
1979 228,000 53.4% 89.0% 
1980* 209,000 53.4% 75.6% 
1982 242,000 52.2% 89.6% 
1985 244,000 48.1% 88.0% 
* A national referendum on Swedish nuclear power in which - by a special 
decision of the Riksdag - foreign citizens were allowed to vote if entitled to 
vote in local elections. 
Figure 2.   Foreign citizens entitled to vote and turnout in local elections 1976–1985111      
The exact reasons for the decline in immigrant voting participation are unknown. 
Benito writes: 
There are some studies carried out by Universities of Stockholm and 
Gothenburg as well as by the Integration Board and the former 
Immigration Board, but they cannot explain why immigrants vote in local 
elections less than Swedish citizens. The only reason appearing in all the 
reports is that immigrants, as long as they do not become Swedish citizens, 
do not feel concerned with Swedish society to the extent that they want to 
participate politically.112 
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Concluding with a brief comparison with the German example, Swedish history 
shows a historical struggle and trend to proactively extend voting rights as broadly as 
possible, whereas the German example shows explicit attempts in the early years of 
German democracy to limit citizenship and the franchise to ethnic Germans via jus 
sanguinis. The general pursuit of inclusion based on jus domicili includes bifurcating 
suffrage from citizenship to allow some voting rights for non-citizen residents. 
Furthermore, immigrants to Sweden can apply for citizenship five years earlier than 
immigrants to Germany. Consistent with the inclusive nature of jus domicili, Sweden 
uses a relatively short residency period as the primary condition for obtaining citizenship 
and full suffrage. Indeed, in the not too distant past, immigrants to Sweden could become 
full citizens a full decade faster than immigrants to Germany, and without the dilemma of 
renouncing any previous citizenship. 
B. SWEDISH IMMIGRATION HISTORY 
Like Germany, Sweden had generally established itself as a source of emigrants 
and not a destination for immigrants. High birth rates, a lack of war, and years of 
successful agriculture fueled a population boom in the early nineteenth century.113 By 
mid-century, however, the rural population could no longer support itself on the available 
land, and crop failures and famine coupled with religious intolerance by the state church 
and the marginalized rights of the fourth estate, embodied by the so-called servant laws, 
triggered and sustained a steady flow of emigration.114 The great emigration would push 
nearly one in five Swedes to emigrate during its eighty years, totaling over 1.2 million.115 
This pattern of emigration coupled with Sweden’s location on the northern periphery of 
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Europe and the lack of economic opportunities to attract émigrés from other lands, as 
Sweden’s own emigration underscored, reinforced the perception that Sweden did not 
typically experience immigration. Miguel Benito gives a snapshot of how that has 
changed: 
The immigrant population in Sweden was 790,445 in 1990, or 9.2 percent 
of the total population. At the end of 2004 the number of immigrants 
increased to 1,100,262 persons, of 12.2 percent of the total population. 
Moreover, about 800,000 persons born in Sweden are children of parents 
from another country of origin. Together with their children they represent 
21 percent of the population today.116  
Like Germany, the size of the immigrant population, or children of immigrants, is 
significant within the overall population, representing twenty percent of residents in 
Sweden 2004, compared with about thirty percent of residents in Germany in 2005.117 
Given the tendency demonstrated by Germany to naturally exclude immigrants from 
voting, even in local elections during the entire period that it takes to obtain citizenship, 
why would Swedish law provide some voting rights to immigrants after only three years? 
Part of the answer may be legal precedents set in the transformative years of Swedish 
government as universal franchise became the standard, and part of the answer may be 
due to the character of early immigration to Sweden. 
The transition period of the early twentieth century saw important legal 
precedents set in Sweden on behalf of immigrant rights at the same time that the 
egalitarian pursuit of universal suffrage was at the forefront of the national political 
debate. The flurry of protest and legal response that surrounded the high profile 
deportations of Jews as a result of the Utvisningslagen, or Deportation Act, set important 
precedents for immigrant rights. In response to the guarantee of rights for non-Swedish 
citizens, the government modified regulations regarding residence in 1918. The 
government, with strong influence from the state church, sought to retain control over 
who could live and work within Sweden despite the fallout of the infamous expulsion of 
long-standing Jewish residents. Hammar writes that the new ordinance provided, 
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that a non-Swedish citizen wishing to reside in Sweden had to obtain a 
residence permit. Lack of a residence permit was made grounds for 
expulsion. Since the issuance of residence and work permits became the 
province of an administrative body, and since it could arbitrarily reject 
applications for permits, thereby forcing the expulsion of a foreign citizen, 
[the previous] legal guarantees were clearly somewhat compromised.118 
The resident Jews are a unique example of non-Swedish immigrants at that time. 
Along with some Calvinist Walloons, they were invited to settle in Sweden based on their 
essential skills and knowledge, but were denied citizenship because of the influence of 
the state church. Hammar points out that, “no other subjects of the king were permitted 
during this period to believe in, and absolutely not to openly confess any other than the 
evangelical Lutheran religion, for this would threaten the core interests of the state . . . 
Membership of the state was not yet based primarily on ethnicity, origin, or language, but 
more on religion.”119 
Because the state church represented the old authority of the state, it is not 
surprising that both the Liberals and Socialists fought to break the influence of the church 
over government policy and provide legal protections for these “immigrants.” As 
mentioned, the government modified residency rules to allow the refusal of residency 
applications as a means of expelling immigrants, “But no government has applied the law 
in this way since it was first passed . . . .”120 Aside from the immigrants just named, the 
dominant nature of immigration in Sweden as it developed during the interwar and 
postwar period was that it was chiefly fueled by immigration from other Nordic 
countries. The principle source of immigration has been other Scandinavian countries, 
especially after Sweden entered a unified Nordic labor market with Denmark, Norway, 
and Finland in 1954.121 Allowing the flow of persons within this region is not unusual 
considering historical ties that united Sweden under a single government with one or 
more of these countries during Sweden’s history. The heavy influence of Nordic 
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immigrants on the overall character of immigration contributed to the ease with which 
Sweden actively sought and adopted legal protections for immigrants. There have not 
been any studies or academic conclusions to make this specific connection. Two excerpts 
from Tomas Hammar’s writing on Swedish immigration history and issues leave 
considerable room for this conclusion. The combination of very little experience Swedes 
have traditionally had with immigrants and the dominance of Nordic, and especially 
Finnish immigrants within the overall immigration picture for Sweden during the postwar 
period, certainly provided a much more receptive environment for legislation to 
institutionalize the principle that, “all members of society are entitled to equal treatment, 
and this includes immigrants as well.”122 Hammar concludes that, “immigration policy is 
strongly affected by this ideology and, . . . it aims at ensuring that immigrants live and 
work as equals with Swedish citizens . . . .”123 
The Swedish government acknowledged the change from a country of emigration 
to a country of immigration in the postwar period, establishing a task force in 1965 
specifically dedicated to immigrant policy.124 Amongst the proposals and 
recommendations from the task force, “an investigation was begun to determine how 
foreign citizens could be placed on an equal footing with Swedish citizens.”125 The 
problem at the time was not that Sweden was without an immigration policy; different 
legal measures and bureaucracy had existed for some time. The profound shift for 
Sweden in 1965 was that official policy abandoned, “the idea that immigrants would 
eventually be assimilated into Swedish society.”126 Under the previous assimilationist 
mindset, “there were no special programs for immigrants, for it was thought that access to 
the Swedish social welfare that developed in the postwar years was sufficient. The basis 
for this social welfare policy was a program worked out by the Social Democratic Party 
before the war was even over.”127 
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The work of the task force continued, and by 1975, parliament passed a non-
binding resolution to declare the government’s intent with respect to Swedish immigrant 
and minority policy. The resolution centered on the principles of equality, freedom of 
choice, and partnership.128 Hammar explained the goals thus: 
The goal of equality implies the continued efforts to give immigrants the 
same living standard as the rest of the population. The goal of freedom of 
choice implies that public initiatives are to be taken to assure members of 
ethnic and linguistic minorities domiciled in Sweden a genuine choice 
between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a 
Swedish cultural identity. The goal of partnership implies that the 
different immigrant and minority groups on the one hand and the native 
population on the other both benefit from working together.129 
Obviously, the goals and policies to accommodate immigrants and work with 
them through partnership is a departure from the differentialist approach in Germany. 
This policy approach remained in place until 1997 when a new policy was formally 
approved, centering on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.130 What is even 
more interesting than the generous approach towards immigrants expressed here is that 
during the same time period that these recommendations were made, Sweden actually 
tightened immigration control in 1967–68 by requiring work permits before an immigrant 
could travel to Sweden.131 “The Swedish Immigration Board was created in 1969 and, 
since 1970, the majority of immigrants to Sweden have been refugees. In the 1990s and 
2000s the biggest refugee groups have come from Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq and Iran.”132 
In response to the increasing influence of immigrants in Sweden, 1991 saw the 
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platform of fiscal conservatism and anti-immigration sentiment. The party managed to 
win seats in the 1991 elections, but did not gain sufficient votes to return to the Riksdag 
in 1994 or since.133 
In summary, Sweden’s short history of large-scale immigration has demonstrated 
a very open legal and cultural acceptance of immigrants. Some of the institutional basis 
for this may have solidified because it chiefly concerned other Nordic peoples as 
immigrants in the early years and because the Social Democratic party was anxious to 
welcome workers that would strengthen its ranks. By the time immigration flows for 
labor had largely subsided by the early 1970s, humanitarian acceptance of refugees 
continued to bring significant numbers of people into Sweden of increasingly non-
European and non-Nordic backgrounds.134 (See Figure 2) Finally, despite the appearance 
of Nydemokrati in the early 1990s, there does not appear to be any movement afoot that 
would undermine the secure legal and cultural foundation for continued acceptance of 
immigrants to Sweden. Research into the attitudes towards immigrants in different 
European countries revealed that despite high levels of immigration and contact with 
immigrants, “Sweden has the most open attitude towards hosting immigrants, whatever 
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Figure 3.   Foreign-born population by region of origin (1970–2004)136 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Each Country Is Unique 
The principal purpose at the outset of this investigation was to trace the 
foundations for current voting and citizenship law in Germany and Sweden back to 
events and politics that shaped its character for each country. The temptation when 
comparing the two countries is to try and determine what the salient differences were in 
democratic development for each country in order to attribute differences now to their 
root causes. This search for the independent variable that drives the dependent variable 
would, however, miss the proverbial forest while searching out a particular tree. The 
differences between Germany and Sweden today are a reflection of the amalgamation of 
sociopolitical and cultural development of the two countries over more than a century of 
history and are every bit as varied and complex as the DNA for a living organism, but not 
nearly as ordered. To be sure, however, there are important similarities, but the 
differences are much more important in defining the democratic and immigrant character 
or each country. The same is likely true for each of the remaining twenty-five countries 
within the European Union and their varied outcomes relative to the process of immigrant 
enfranchisement. 
The general directional vector of democratic development in both countries 
influenced the legal precedents and national identity surrounding voting. Germany saw a 
general expansion of suffrage in the late nineteenth century, culminating in the extension 
of voting rights to women near the end of the First World War. Likewise, Sweden 
experienced a gradual expansion of suffrage during the nineteenth century, also 
culminating with the extension of suffrage to women shortly after the First World War. 
More important than these similarities is that Germany’s suffrage gains came by way of 
pressure from the top of political society. Chancellor Bismarck, used suffrage as a tool 
for ameliorating the influence of radical reformers and increasing and perpetuating the 
power of the monarchy. The establishment of citizenship suffered from the same 
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pressures to protect existing power by excluding non-Germans through jus sanguini. By 
contrast, Sweden’s suffrage gains came about via pressure from below, in direct 
contravention to the established powers of the monarchy and state church. The struggle to 
overcome existing power supported a path to spread voting rights more broadly to those 
with a vested interest via jus domicili.  
No attempt will be made to determine which of these two approaches merits 
greater praise. Sweden’s approach to incorporating immigrants into the welfare state 
through specific policies of cultural accommodation, ease of naturalization (especially 
with generous allowance for dual citizenship), and incorporation of noncitizen residents 
in the political process deserves high praise for active and pragmatic consideration for the 
welfare of immigrants. The salient differences between the two countries are too 
numerous to list without the egregious omission of additional factors of import. One 
cultural factor stands out as having been particularly important: Sweden did not have the 
same pressures associated with much higher levels of more heterogeneous immigration 
that Germany faced. Perhaps the most important contributing factor to that outcome is the 
silent, but significant element of geography. 
2. Geographic Proximity Influences Nationalism 
The most important difference in the suffrage movement between Germany and 
Sweden was the explicit measures taken in Germany to limit the franchise to ethnic 
Germans via the principle of blood inheritance or jus sanguinis, whereas the reform 
pressure within Sweden was always towards a goal of greater inclusivity, using the 
principle of jus domicili. Bismarck’s goal in perpetuating the power of the monarchy 
would necessarily lead to an attempt to limit the distribution of power via the franchise to 
groups that would be more loyal or easier to control, whereas the Swedish example 
showed that even when limited, the franchise could be extended to all those with a stake 
in the affairs of government via their taxes. A factor complimenting and magnifying these 
effects of jus sanguinis and jus domicili is simple geographic proximity. 
The geographic proximity factor in these cases acts as a multiplier for the risks 
associated with extending the franchise in each country. Geography favors a more liberal 
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extension of the voting rights in Sweden and a more constrictive construction of voting 
rights in Germany. First, Germany’s position at the center of continental Europe allowed 
much more access and communication with neighboring countries that were ethnically 
and linguistically different from Germany, German-speaking Austria excepted. By the 
time Bismarck is able to consolidate Imperial Germany using pan-German nationalism to 
unite the various German states, it would be easy to forget that German nationalism itself 
was in part a heightened reaction to Napoleonic conquests that had treated Germany as a 
intermediate stopping point between France and its pursuit of continental domination. 
The perception that Germans were surrounded by foreign, and sometimes unfriendly, 
nations would naturally reinforce the desire to limit incorporation of non-Germans from 
participation in the German Volk-nation, even if these non-Germans lived inside 
Germany. Indeed, the entire debate about a German state which might include Austria 
was not only about whether Austria or Prussia should be the most influential of the 
German states, but also about how to incorporate Volk-German Austria without also 
including the Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbians and others connected to Austria 
through the empire. 
Second, Sweden’s location and geographic boundaries not only excluded it as the 
gateway between larger powers such as Russia and France, but its geographic neighbors 
were also ethnically or politically kinsmen to the Swedes. The geography alone meant 
that with the standard modes of transportation of the nineteenth century, Sweden did not 
face the migratory potential or pressure that Germany faced with Poles searching for 
work, or Germans needing Poles to work. Furthermore, the cultural and historical ties 
with its neighbors made differences much less pronounced between Sweden and its 
neighbors than the differences between Germany and its neighbors. Simply put, Sweden 
could afford to be more generous in pursuing a path of more inclusive democratic 
incorporation via jus domicili rather than selective incorporation via jus sanguinis, 
because it did not face the perceived risk of losing the country to outside influences. In 
this way, geographic proximity’s influence on nationalism reinforces the motivations at 
work when comparing the top-down franchise movement of Bismarck, versus the 
bottom-up franchise movement of Swedish farmers. 
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3. Social Welfare Does Not Appear to Matter 
As noted in the introduction, immigrants to Sweden pursue and receive 
citizenship at a rate fifteen times that of Germany.137 Drawing the conclusion that 
Sweden’s higher rates of naturalization somehow proves the superiority of its approach 
over Germany’s would be unwarranted. Furthermore, the social welfare benefits available 
to immigrants in each country are similar enough that the apparent differences cannot be 
attributed to variations in the welfare state.  
Both countries extend generous benefits to immigrants, including Germany, 
which does not “discriminate between citizen and noncitizen,” in “contributory social 
welfare schemes.”138 Gregg Kvistad notes an irony within the state protections that 
generally apply to citizens and immigrants alike throughout Europe, writing that, “guest-
workers in Europe, by means of integration in welfare regimes, labor markets, and other 
social institutions, have acquired significant statuses of membership in states that legally 
and politically are not their own.”139 With a more or less comparable approach to legal 
and social welfare for noncitizen, the various incentives and disincentives at work for 
individuals to pursue citizenship in Germany or Sweden reflect more than the appeal of 
the welfare state. Furthermore, extending access to the generous social welfare systems in 
place throughout much of Europe may give the false impression for host countries and 
citizens that such access will necessarily provide a positive normative influence on 
immigrants towards the host country through a sense of equality. Kvistad argues against 
this, writing, “Being treated as an equal by a welfare institution is not the same as acting 
as an equal. Petitioning courts for equal treatment, or having courts petitioned for you, is 
not the same as electing governments that appoint court judges.”140 
 
137 Brubaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative 
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(Stamford: JAI Press Inc., 1998): 147. 
139 Kvistad, "Membership Without Politics? The Social and Political Rights of Foreigners in 
Germany," in Immigration, Citizenship, and the Welfare State in Germany and the United States,145. 
140 Ibid., 144–145. 
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Other factors are clearly at work. Kvistad agrees, writing, “the ‘choice’ to remain 
a noncitizen even in the face of a relatively liberal naturalization policy reduces both the 
noncitizen and the community to role players in a system of material exchange. 
Membership becomes the right to get and have.”141 The difference between legal 
residency in a welfare state and citizenship is clear to immigrants.  
B. SEVERAL QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
1. Immigration Within the EU and Its Effect On Voting 
One of the changes instituted across the EU in recent years has been the asserted 
right to participate in local and EU elections. The rationale for the change follows the 
freedom of movement and legal protections that citizens of EU member states enjoy 
throughout the EU. In 2006, 1.2 million, or fully forty percent of immigrants that settled 
within the EU were citizens of other EU member states.142 This corresponds to a ten 
percent yearly increase from 2002 to 2006 in the number citizens of EU member states 
that have resettled to another country within the EU.143 The political participation of 
these immigrants in their host countries, however, is completely unknown. Part of this is 
due to the changes allowing them the right to participate in local elections in their country 
of residence, both as voter and candidate, are fairly recent. Several question, however, 
arise relative to these changes: Does moving within the EU disrupt levels of voter 
participation? Do internal migrants show greater interest and or participation in EU 
parliamentary elections than citizens residing in their own countries? Rates of voter 
participation for EU elections has lagged the rates of participation for national elections 
by as little as a fraction of a percent in Belgium, where voting is mandatory and 
participation is about ninety percent, to as much as approximately forty percentage points 
in Sweden where national elections see participation rates in the neighborhood of eighty 
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percent, but EU parliamentary elections draw less than forty percent.144 (Figure 4) In 
addition to answering these questions, determining if the mobility of voters produces new 
or changing political preferences will also be important to understanding the increasingly 
mobile and evolving electorate within Europe.  
 
Figure 4.   Comparative rates of participation in national and EU elections145 
2. Understanding the Metamorphosis from Immigrant to Citizen 
Given the more inclusive process for incorporation of immigrants in Sweden and 
the push by Swedish governments to consider the rights and status of immigrants in the 
1960s, there is naturally more data to analyze regarding immigrant voting participation in 
Sweden. The unfortunate problem is that the data only shows voter turnout of non-citizen 
residents as compared to Swedish citizens, and this turnout is lower and continues to 
decline at rates faster than for citizens. The data from Sweden also does not measure 
whether immigrants that vote also pursue naturalization at higher rates than non-voting 
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immigrants, not does it show the levels of voter participation for naturalized citizens.  By 
contrast, the recognition of immigration by German governments is relatively recent, and 
there is a dearth of data on levels of voter participation for newly naturalized citizens or 
even for EU citizens participating in EU elections. Most important, the effects of voting 
rights for immigrants on their attitudes about democracy, its outcomes, and their 
economic, political, and civic participation in their host countries are completely 
unknown.  
The policy concern here is that similar to the long denial by German governments 
over the existence of permanent immigration stunted pragmatic policy reform for 
naturalization of second and third generation immigrants, the absence of tracking data to 
reflect the acculturation or rejection of immigrants to democratic norms and values is can 
likewise prevent opportunities to craft policies to avoid conflicts and enhance the 
interaction between immigrants and their host countries. Significantly more time and 
research has been dedicated to the questions of Muslim integration, political and 
otherwise, into Western Europe. Researchers recognize the implications of the particular 
economic, social, religious, and political preferences that increasing levels of Muslim 
immigrants may bring. Zachary Shore conjectured in 2006 on the implications of such 
preferences: 
America may not even recognize Europe in a few short decades. Within 
the next ten to twenty years, as European society becomes more Muslim 
and more infused with those from non-European cultures, social 
democracy will break down. The welfare state that has characterized 
European governments, whether on the political Left or Right, since the 
Second World War, will begin to fracture under the stress of cultural 
heterogeneity.146  
Many Europeans would consider the fracturing of social democracy and the 
dismantling of the associated welfare state an existential threat. The foundation of 
Shore’s argument is twofold, the first part involves general policy preferences by 
Muslims to move away from vestiges of the welfare state, and the second part involves a 
reaction by established citizenries to not share with Muslims the benefits of social 
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welfare that are only possible through very high levels of taxation. The results of the 
2202-3 European Social Survey support the conclusions regarding exclusionary attitudes 
towards immigrants and outsiders for some countries. Perhaps counterintuitive to what 
one might expect after reviewing the details on Germany and Sweden, is that both of 
these countries, despite their very different legal backgrounds and formulas for immigrant 
enfranchisement, demonstrate high levels of acceptance for outside cultures.147 Where 
respondents in these two countries differed the most was in their attitudes towards the 
endorsement of equal rights for immigrants, where Sweden was very high and Germany 
low, and whether governments ought to expel immigrants for criminal behavior or 
unemployment, where Germans were much more likely to support such actions and 
Swedes were most likely to oppose it.148  
These examples show that interaction between immigrants and host county 
cultures needs to be measured better in order to accurately understand the dynamics of 
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